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Excerpts from sources relating to the various topics, selected
references, directions for carrying on observation and organizing
anthropological data, and a list of suggestive questions for the
guidance of students are included in this valuable article.
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The Will of the People. WILLIAM MCDOUGALL. The Sociological
Review, 1912, 5, 89-104.
Both Rousseau and his critics have failed to clear up the am-
biguities in the doctrine of the general will. This has been due to an
inadequate conception of collective psychology. The intent of the
article is to define the nature of volition according to lines mapped
out in the author's Social Psychology, and to determine by analogy
the characteristics of collective volition and collective action as
contrasted with lower forms of collective striving and acting.
"Individual volition is essentially distinguished from lower forms
of acting and striving by the fact that, in some peculiarly intimate
sense, the striving is governed and maintained by self-conscious-
ness: it is distinguished from acting which issues directly from
desire or impulse or from a conflict of desires or impulses, by the
fact that the idea, the thought, of one's self plays a dominant and
decisive role in the process."
This conation has an existence and organization of its own
distinct from the secondary system of ideas; an idea moves us when
it awakens, excites or is associated with specifically directed conative
tendencies. The linking of an idea with latent dispositions is the
process of forming sentiments; these by organization and elabora-
tion constitute character. Chief among the sentiments is the
sentiment for that object of thought which we call the self. This
"self-regarding sentiment" essential to the higher form of volition
may be amalgamated with concrete objects, as one's dog, or with
abstiact objects, as benevolence. An important item for social
psychology is that man normally acquires sentiments for the highly
complex objects constituted by groups of persons, large or small,—
such as family, party, or college. The essential conditions of the
-foimation of sentiment foi a group is (1) that the group be perma-
nent enough to be recognized as such by men in general, (2) that
each member thinks of himself as belonging to the group, (3) that
"the group shall be one that lives among other similar groups,
maintaining and asserting over against them its corporate existence,
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and made by them the object of judgments of value, of praise and
blame, approval and disapproval, of friendly and hostile feeling,
of emulation, rivalry, or opposition."
The self-regarding sentiment, originally directed toward the
individual self, thus becomes extended to the degree that man
identifies himself with his family and with larger groups. "In so
far as such a complex dual sentiment grows up in the minds of each
member, the group-spirit is powerful, the group has a true collective
self-consciousness, and is capable of a truly collective volition."
When unmediated impulses which are present in lower forms of
striving are controlled by group-sentiment aiming at the common
good, we have a case of collective volition. '
The parallel between individual and collective volition is this:
"The individual volition is governed by individual self-conscious-
ness, i. e., by the self-regarding sentiment of the individual or by
the impulses and desires that are awakened within this sentiment.
Collective volition is governed by collective self-consciousness,
i. e., by the impulses and desires that are awakened within the
collective self-regarding sentiment, the extended self-regarding
sentiment which makes each member regard the good of the group
as his own good."
From the standpoint of the analysis summarized above Professor
McDougall suggests that the doctrine of Rousseau should be cor-
rected in three respects: (i) The genesis of the collective self is
not voluntary association, but is the development of the sentiment
for the nation in the minds of citizens by the gradual evolution of
institutions, tradition, and intercourse. (2) A collective self is
possible in a large community, as distinguished from Rousseau's
requirement of a small deliberative body; small groups, reciprocally
acting, are essential if a truly collective deliberation is reached in
large modern states. (3) Rousseau's doctrine of the common
good is ambiguous, and is most applicable to the highest form of
collective volition in which common purpose, tradition, memories,
participation in crises, and harmonious action have developed the
notion of a group which determines individual conduct. In lower
forms of collective striving the object aimed at is the good of all,
since here the private good of the several members of the group is
most urgent, not the good of the whole.
The distinction between the good of all and the good of the
whole is applied finally to the national life. Real patriotism or
nationalism is identified with the highest form of collective striving.
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"And the nation is capable of truly collective volition only so far
as the organization it possesses, in the form of institutions and
traditions, enables it to deliberate collectively for the good of the
whole as such, such deliberation and action being moved and
sustained, not by the desire of every man for his own private good,
nor yet by the desire of every man for the good of all, but by the
desire of every man for the good of the whole, a desire which is
rooted in and springs from the collective self-consciousness, the
collective self-regarding sentiment of the whole for the whole."
National sentiment must be cultivated, the writer urges, in order
that there may be stimulus for moral effort to take the place of
the supernatural sanctions which are now losing their hold on the
population.
The article has been outlined at some length because it reveals
a significant tendency operating in the development of social
psychology. It is a hopeful indication for the future of the new
science if it insists upon proceeding pragmatically: Dr. McDougall's
method of dealing with national problems from the approach of
psychology is evidence of this insistence. There is a statesman-like
quality in the spirit of Bentham and the Utilitarians which ought
not to die, however inadequate their mechanical assumptions now
appear. Professor McDougall's contribution adopts the social
outlook of the Utilitarians while fundamentally it is a criticism of
Bentham's main theses. Wallas and Bligh also display the same
pragmatic interest, the lattei anticipating the gradual increase of a
body of experts in social psychology who will utilize the principles
of human nature in planning and directing individual and national
improvement-enterprises, somewhat after the manner of the
Freudian practitioners.
In one respect, however, the article is not quite satisfactory.
As noted before, it pleads for a collective volition or nationalism.
The author contends that the object, humanity, is too vague to
elicit devotion. But one of the excellent points urged is that no
group forms a wholesome group attitude without the correction
and opposition of other groups. Consequently, in order that a
national, patriotic consciousness may develop it is necessary that
coincidently a consciousness of the wider group comprehending the
various nations shall evolve. The international consciousness is
not to be identified with the vague abstract entity humanity, as
seems to be implied.
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